Introduction
landowners, who have diverse characteristics, and their objcctivcs arc divcrsc. While some have Land ownership has many social-economic and argued that the name ol' NIPF is not appropriate environmental implications. Forest ownership is (see. Finley et al. 2001 , Wiseman 2003 , the term complex and varies in different regions in the has long historical use and data associated with it. U.S. An important segment of forests in the U.S The number of NIPF owners in the U.S. is large. is owned by non-industrial private forest (NIPF) In the mid-1990s it consisted of an estimated 9.9 million ownership units that collectively held about 363 million acres or 49 percent of the nation's forest land, with about 94% of NIPF ownerships (or 9.3 million) being individuals (Birch 1996) . A recent survey shows that the total number of individual NIPF owners increased from 9.3 million in 1994 to 10.3 million in 2002 (Butler and Leatherberry 2004) . This change has important implications. Harrcll(1989) forccastcd the share o1.U.S. timber supply fiorn NIPFs would rise to 60% by the year 2030.
Over the past several decades, many studies have addressed the "problems" of NIPF.ownerships (e.g., Clawson 1957 , Row 1978 , Binkley 198 1, Cubbagc 1983 , S i r -2002 . Thcsc problems include: I ) discrepancies between individual utility (or profit) maximization and social objectives, 2) the low efficiency of small scale forest management, 3) ignorance of forest manasement practices among NIPF owners, and 4) reluctance of NIPF landowners to invest in forcst and/or undertake timber harvesting. Except for the first of the listed problems, all these problems are related to the nature of small scale ownerships. Indeed, with the exception of forest lands managed by Timber Investment Management Organizations (TIMOs), thc majority of NIPFs (mostly owncd by individuals) are small: in the 1990s, 40% owners owned less than 10 acres and 96% owners owned less than 100 acres (Birch 1996) .
The "problems" identified for small-scale NIPFs have recently received greater attention becausc of accclcrating parcclization. Parcelization is the reduction in size of forestland ownerships. It refers mainly to ownership subdivision rather than forestland fragmentation. Forestland fragmentation means the breaking up of large tracts of forest into smaller fragments. Increase in thc numbcr of small NIPF owncrs is synonymous with parcelization. The increase in individual owners (by 1 1 % from 1990 and 2000) occurred primarily in the small holder category (less than 50 acres). In the U.S., large forestland ownerships with a primary purpose of timber production have remain largcly intact, but thc acrcagc in midsize woodlots is shrinking and the class representing the smallest landholdings is growing (Birch 1996 , DeCoster 1998 . Currently, each NIPF owner holds an average of 24 acres, and it is expected the average size will drop to 17 acres by 201 0 (Tyrell and Dunning 2000) .
Although many studies have been conducted (c.g., Grcenc and Blatncr 1986 , Romm et al. 1987 , Hyberg and Hol thausen 1989 , Kuuluvainen 1 989, Newman and Wear 1 993, Kuuluvainen et al 1996 , Karppinen 1998 , there is not any convincing economic explanation on why the number of small NIPFs owners has been increasing. In this papcr wc attempt to provide such an explanation using the transaction cost approach. Our transaction costs cover both the production and consumption of all forest products. Providing a reasonable explanation for increasing small NIPF ownership will contribute to the design of appropriatc policies that address the problems associated with small NIPF ownerships. We f rst begin with some historical background on the evolution of forestland ownership in the U.S., followed by our economic explanation. We address the implications for forest management in our final scction.
Historical Context
NIPF owncrships vary grcatly from country to country. Historical context explains a great deal of the difference since the institution of ownership has some path dependence and rigidity. The current distribution of the private forestland and the dynamic processes of change in the U.S. are rclatcd to thc country's historical and institutional arrangements, such as land disposal policy, over the last 300 years. Current NIPF ownerships come from inheritance, market, or land use changes (i.e., from farm to forests). In other countries such as Canada (particularly West Canada), forestlands arc largcly hcld in public owncrship. Public ownership is less responsive to forestland markets. In Australia, Alexander and Hall ( 1998) see that the lack of historical farm forestry is the major impediment to small-scale forestry development.
In colonial America. England made large grants of land to thc London Company, thc Plymouth Company, and later to other individuals and groups. The objective of the colonial governments was to establish compact settlements of small, family-size farms. A fear of monopoly made the governments favor free market and small landowncrship. Gradually, lands in the 13 colonial states were dispersed to numerous individual owners. As settlement extended westward after the Revolutionary War, the territory beyond the Appalachians was given to settlers through land bonuses to war veterans (61 million acres), grants, and sales (Clcppcr and Mcycr 1965, Cubbage et al. 1993) . The Homestead Act of 1862 was designed to rapidly populate the western part of the country, which had been obtained through the Louisiana Purchase and treaties between the U.S. and Mcxico. A clamor for liberalism lcd to thc formation of the Free-Soil party in 1830, which called for free distribution of federal lands. The Homestead Act allowed anyone to file for a quarter-section of free land (1 60 acres) if improvements were made within 5 years. Acceptable improvements included building a housc, digging a wcll, plowing 10 acres, fencing, or living on the land. Additionally, a settler could claim a quarter-section of land by "timber culture" (commonly called a "tree claim"). This required that the settler plant and successfully cultivate 10 acres of timber (Hibbard 1965) . It has bccn cstimatcd about 287 million acres of public land were claimed by homesteaders (Cubbage et al. 1 993) .
In 1891, U.S. Congress enacted the General Revision Act in order to reverse the massive process of land disposal. Extensive public ownership of forcst land in thc U.S. bcgan in thc latc 1800s, and by the middle of 1900s a private-public division of forest landownership was firmly established. The major reasons for public forestland ownerships were environmental concerns and conservation movement. Today, a large amount of forcstland in the Northwest is still held by the federal government. Private industry, which initially obtained forestland from the federal governmen t, expanded tlieir forestland ownership dramatically in the first half of the 20th century and then gradually stabilized (Table 1) .
Thc cxistencc of a large number of farms in the 1900s is an important factor in what ultimately became a large number of individual forestland ownerships. In 1920, there were 6.5 million farms in the U.S. with an average size of 149 acres (USDA 1 997). Many farmers held forestland, and forcstry has oftcn bccn vicwcd as a typc of agriculture. In the early 1900s, farmers were thought to be most desirable owners of private forestland and able to devote the most care and attention on the management of their woodlots. Farm woodlands contributed to total farm income; and holding somc forcst land on a farm is often considered to be economically efficient in financial diversity and the use of labor and capital. Even today, forestry is still important for farmers. For example, Selter (2003) observed that farms holding larger amounts of forest land more likely survived in Gcrmany. During thc pcriod from 197 1 to 1 995, 90% of the enterprises that managed more than 5 ha (1 2 acres) forest land survived. These farms were not only able to continue as forest enterprises. but also as mixed farms, retaining their agricultural land. Over the same period, farms with smallcr forcst land holding wcrc lcss likcly lo survive.
Many farmers who previously had not owned forestland later became forest owners when their farm land reverted to forest. Large scale of conversion from agricultural land to forestland has
occurred since the mid 20th century due to the loss of competitiveness of agriculture on marginal lands, as along with the implerncntation of government incentives program promoting reforestation. The southern states, previously dominated by agriculture, have seen the biggest expansion in small scale forest ownership due to favorable climate condition for tree growth and the decline of agriculture. The biggest change since the 1950s has been within the NIPF category, mostly the decline in ownership by farmers and the rise of forestland ownership by individuals outside of traditional farming and forestry operations. More recently, thc major trcnd has becn thc forest product industry's selling timberland to TIMO and NIPF owners. In the U.S. South, it has been estimated that about 25% of forest industry owned timberlands were sold to TIMO, REIT (Real Estate Investment Trust) and other NIPF owners.
The Demand for Small-Scale Private Forestland
With thc cxccption of Sutton ( 1 973), a majority of studies (e.g., Clawson 1957 , Wilstrom and Ally 1967 , Noel-1 975, Row 1978 , Gardner 1 98 1 ) have found that small parcel size significantly increases the production costs per unit in harvesting operation, plantation, and management. Sincc most NIPFs arc small in sizc, it is bclicvcd that NIPFs have lower economic efficiency than industrial private forests (Doll and Orazen 1978, Cubbage, 1983) . Other studies have shown that timber supply has a positive relationship with holding size (e.g., Binkley 1981 , Greene and Blatcncr 1986 . Romm ct al. 1987 . Towcll (1982) claims that, by a conservative estimate, private NIPFs are producing only half or less of what they are capable of, and Siry (2002) shows that NIPFs are generally managed less intensively than their larger counterparts. Only a few studies have found land holding sizc to have minor influence on timber supply (Dennis 1989 , Hyberg and Hothausen 1989 , Kuuluvainen 1989 ). This raises the question of why the number of NIPF owners, particularly those with small forest landholdings, continues to rise nation-wide, even though such ownership is less efficient for timber production. It is well known that, like NIPF owncrships, manufacturing began with small family owned finns. but the smaller firms were gradually replaced by larger scale firms over time. In agriculture, although family farms are still important in North America, farm size has dramatically increased from an average size of 149 acrcs in 1920 to 500 acres in 1997 (USDA 1997). Why NIPF holdings are getting smaller while manufacturing and manufacturing activities are concentrating? What made small NIPF holdings so popular, in spite of its lack of efficiency in timber production, in contrast with manufacturing and agriculturc in the U.S.?
It should be noted that parcelization is also occurring in Europe and elsewhere. Harrison et al. (2002) observed, "throughout the world, there appears a trend to move from industrial forestry towards landholder-based forest management and community forcstry and small-scalc (often referred to as 'smallholder') forestry is of growing importance." Thus, a convincing explanation for increasing small forestland holdings is important to global forestry.
One possible explanation for the increasing numbcr of small forcstland holdings is related to the partitioning of forestland during generational transfers. This is not convincing since there are no constraints that prevent inheritors of forest land from selling it. When they choose to keep a small piece of forestland, the revealed value or utility of holding must bc largcr than selling it. Furthermore, Jacobson (I 998) finds 70% of Sorest owners acquired their land through purchase, and a survey reveals a similar trend in Alabama, where 64% of landowners acquired their land through purchase or trade. Thus the majority of new owners get thcir land from purchasc, not inhcritance.
Another possible explanation is that demand for forestland increases as population and income grow while forestland (or land in general) supply is limited. However, agricultural lands are concentrating as population and income grow at the samc timc whcn forestlands are parcclizing. It is interesting to note that only the small holders (less than 50 acres) are increasing rapidly. while mid-size holders (50-1 00 acres) are decreasing. A third explanation is that inheritance taxes during generational transfer of forestland cause forest parcelization. However, Mehmood and Zhang (2001) have shown that taxes are not a significant factor in forcst parcelization.
Finally, a common explanation is that forests have multiple uses and an increasing number of landowners use their forestland for residential purposes, aesthetic enjoyment, hunting, moral commitment, nature conservation, estate investment, etc. in addition to timbcr production (see, Karppineen 1 998, Hugosson and Ingemarson 2004) . Recent surveys (e.g., Butler and Leatherberry 2004) indicate that timber production is not a primary objective for most NIPF owners. This explanation is plausible. But our explanation is that it is cconomically rational to owning forestland (thus the goods and services a lorest can provide) rather than obtaining the same goods and services from other means (such as the market) when the demand for the service increases.
Because of the multiple ob-jectives for NIPF owncrs, studics arc incrcasingly using utility rather than prof t maximization to analyze their economic behaviors (e.g., Binkley 1981) . Utility maximization can better explain the difference in timber management and supply between different ownerships, and the trade-off among diffcrent outputs and managcmcnt intcnsity undcr a given amount of land. But utility models have not considered that landowners also make decisions about wl~etlier to own forestland, and how much to own, and adjust the size or quality of their forestland while trying to maximize their utility. Utility maximization has bccn limitcd to the trade-oSf among the ditferent outputs rather than between trade-off between using market and non-market, and this may be why NIPF models have generally failed to capture the dynamics of NIPF landholding changes.
A pcrson who has wants of multiplc products and services fi-om lorestland is faced with a choice of whether to get them from forests owned by others through the market or by owning forestland. There has been an increase over time in the amount of goods and services that are purchased from markct, duc to incrcascd specialization and trade. Coase (1937) claims that the relative transaction costs through market versus within the firms determine boundary of firm. Correspondingly, regardless of the objective for owning forestland. if there are no transaction costs it does rate Forest Ownership in the United States: Rationole and Implications . . .
not matter who owns the forestland. If a person can buy forest-related goods and services from rnarkct for lowcr cost than forest owncrship, there is not need to own forestland.
Although non-timber forest products and services are being consumed more frequently, the market for these non-timber products is not well developed. This results in relatively higher transaction costs of obtaining non-timbcr forcst products from the market compared with getting them directly through forestland ownership. Therefore, as demand for non-timber forest products and services grows, more and more people are purchasing a piece of forestland and entering the ranks of small NIPF landowners. In other words, the gains in consumption efficiency (in terms of saving in transaction costs) overweigh the losses in timber production efficiency; thus the number of small scale forest holdings increases and forest parcelization continues.
Wc shall furthcr cxaminc thc relativc changes of the transaction costs in owning forestland vs. getting forest-related services from market. In doing so, we consider all forest products and costs.
Labor transaction costs: Forest management used to be labor intensive. For forest landowners who own or control labor, thcrc arc somc advantages in owning the Ibrestland. The nature of forestry makes it difficult to monitor and measure labor productivity. In other words, transaction costs of hiring labor in forestry are high (Zhang 2001) . Traditionally farmers were the major small NIPF owncrs. Thc transaction costs of labor can be divided into fixed and variable costs. The fixed cost is viewed same regardless long term (whole year) or short term (seasonal) job. while the variable cost is proportional to working hours. A farmer who works on his own farm for 8 months may wish to find an additional 2 months job (or a firmer who works on his own farm for 4 days a week may wish to find a job one day per week). But it will take time -perhaps a few weeks -to find a job. So the cost of seeking job per unit of earnings is extremely expensive for the farmer. Thcrcforc, considcring thc cost of sccking an of9-season job, it is reasonable tor I'arrners to own some NIPF as a source of self-employment at the off season even though the shadow value of self-employment may be lower than the wage off-farm. In addition, the opportunity cost of a self-determined working schedule could be small since the work may be a form of recreation. This is similar to the way that many pcople use their backyards to grow vegetables, even though it does not make sense to use a person's regular wage to calculate the opportunity costs of the time expended. Timberland management for many small land owners is often fun and brings contentment.
Capital transaction costs saving: Investing in timberland for land appreciation or timber production occurs when investors believe that the return is higher than other alternatives. As timberland investment becomes more capital intensive, more capital owncrs arc bccoming forcstland owncrs. Using borrowed money to invest in small NIPF is unlikely since NIPF owners may need to pay higher capital costs than corporations or large forest landowners. Evidence shows that many NIPF owners are wealthy, and thus they do not nced borrow much moncy to invcst in forcstland to meet their growing need li-om Sorests.
Forest product (timber and non-timber) tmnsaction costs:
The transaction costs for marketing timber are high. "No market I know of is like the timber market. A phone call can get you a firm pricc on many common itcms: stock, bond, groceries, clothing, co~nmodities, autos, and so on. But a phone call to 20 timber buyers will likely get you 20 different estimates, and each buyer will want to see your timber before making a firm offer" (Vardaman 1 988). That is why forest industry owns a significant amount of timbcrland at least in the past. Transaction cost l'or non-timber products, especially recreational goods from forests, may be even higher. It is costly to go through the stages of searching, contacting, negotiating, and purchasing these products and services, such as renting a summcr housc or acquiring hunting access from other owners. Some recreation products generated fi-om the forests cannot be moved and do not have standards (beautiful is in the eyes of the beholder); yet they can be consumed frequently. Asymmetric information is everywhere, and transaction costs bccomc paramount. Thus, with increasing demands for nun-timber Sorest products and services (along with increases in population and income) and high transaction costs for getting these products and services from the market, owning forestland becomes more efficient and logical.
The above analyses are to illustrative our point that NIPF owners may savc various transaction costs. Saving transaction costs of labor may have been a major reason for forest ownership by farmers. Recreational service consumers and capital owners may purchase forestland to save the transaction costs for non-timber forest products and capital. Currently a growing sector of small forestland ownerships in the U.S. is wealthy individuals who buy a piece of land for residence, second home, recreation, or investment. Evidence shows that more and more retired people and white collar professionals are holding NIPFs, and invcstmcnt and timber income is only the 6th and 7th place in the list of their holding reasons (Tyrrell and Dunning 2000, p. 10) .
In summary, the growing demand for small NIPF is because: 1) many NTPF owners have some saved capital or stablc and high income, or are at least free of debt, and are able to purchase forest land (or they are farmers and expect to use forestry as seasonal employment); 2) many NIPF owners are retirees whose opportunity costs for time are low and who enjoy the increased spacc and pcaccful living on forest land; 3) many NIPF owners have some special interests in nature and environment (such as hunting, bird watching, privacy etc., which are needed and consumed frequently).
Shrinking Holding Size of NIPF Owners
As thc numbcr of NIPF owncrs incrcase, NIPF owners' holding sizes are shrinking. This can be explained from dynamic change in demand for and supply of forestland (see Fig. 1 ). A few points need to be clarified: First, the optimal holding size is when the marginal utility is cqual to market pricc of forcstland. Second, this figure is only used to explain small forestland ownerships whose primary objective is not timber production. Third, marginal cost refers to the timberland price; the marginal value is the utility of the owners who have multiple objec- 
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Shrinking holding size and increasing number of small NIPF owners.
tives (the utility curve shifts upward as income increases). Fourth, the two utility curves at two income levels are not parallel. The reason behind is that the non-timbcr value has incrcascd relatively more than timber from time To to Lirne T1.
Intuitively it means at time TI, small NIPF owners place more weight on non-timber value as income increases. A similar illustration can be found in Zhang (2005) . Note that for tim bcr production, the holding sizc is based on the production ef'ficiency of' timber production, and holding size is thus expected to increase further. On the other hand, for the consumption purpose of many NIPF owners, the optimum size is based on consumption efficiency. So it is possiblc that thc size of forestland holding for timber production can increase, at the same time that the overall size of NIPF ownerships decline. The smaller parcels are used more for non-timber purposes, while the larger sizes serve for timber production. This is consistcnt with cvidencc from U.S., Finland and other countries. In the U.S., the largest owners thus far have remained intact, but the acreage in midsize woodlots is shrinking and number of owners in the small holding class is growing (DeCoster 1998). In the Southern U.S., tracts of fewer than 1 0 acres increased by 5 1 %, 1 0 4 9 acre tracts increased by 83%, and 50-99 acre tract by 18%; but the holdings between 100-1 000 acres havc dcclincd by 15% tracts over 1 000 acres have increased by 9% ii-om 1978 to 1994 (Moulton and Birch 1 995). From 1 993 to 2003, the number of the owners who hold less than 50 acres has increased by about 20%, while owners holding between 50 to 100 acres have slightly decreased (Butlcr and Lcathcrbeny 2004) .
Similarly, Bliss and Sisock (1998) find that the share of private forestland owned by the largest 1% of the owners in Alabama increased from 51 % to 58% from 1978 to 1993. In Finland the number of medium-sized forest holdings ( 2 s 50 ha) is dccrcasing, whilc both the number of small-and large-sized holdings are increasing (Ripatti 1999). Our explanation is that production-oriented owners increase their holding size because of the economies of scale for timber production, while consumption-oriented owners (small forcst landowncrs) rcducc their holding size when opportunity cost of'land holding (timberland price) increase. Put it in another way, the price for forestland used for consumption is increasing faster than that for forestland used primarily for timber production.
Implications for Forest Management
Due to the economic inefficiency of timber production and potential land use change associated with small NIPF ownerships, there are growing concerns about the impact of parcelization on forestry and thc cnvironment. Such concerns arc not unique in the USA. In Finland, some attempts have been made to circumvent the partitioning process. It was proposed by the Finnish Forest 2000 program that the partitioning of NIPF holdings into units small than 10 ha shall be made illegal, cvcn though this policy has ncvcr been implemented in practice (Ripatti 1996) . We would like to discuss the potential impacts on for forestry by the parcelization.
Converting to Non-Forest Use
The United States loses more than half a million acres of privately-owned timberland to development each year, and NIPF has often been claimed to be one of the causes andlor victims. On the one hand, NIPFs might bc morc casily convcrtcd to non-l'orest use il'the value of other land use (e.g., market value for development) is higher. On the other hand, NIPF owners may prevent forestland from converting to other uses, since they value the forest more than the value from sole timber production pcrspcctivc. Parks or urban forests can be Sound in many big cities for supplying environmental services. Therefore, forest cover could rise with more NIPF owners. Interestingly, Drzyzga and Brown (2002) find more small scale private forests lead to higher forest cover. Stein et al. (2005) also pointcd out that local jurisdictions and states can target eSSorts to prevent or reduce conversion of the most valuable forest lands to keep private working forests resilient and productive.
In lon,o term, multiple use forests that are less intcnsivcly managcd for timbcr production could contribute to (orest expansion. A higher population density, evelything else being equal, increases the absolute land value in every use, but mostly for residential and industrial use. Land in either agriculture or forest is likely to be converted to residential and industrial uses as the economy and population grows. As forest land can provide not only timber, but also in situ value such as recreation, environmental amenity, value of forestland is rising faster than timber prices. Such non-timber value plays a positive role in retaining forests.
For example in New York State, 63% of the land was forested in 1780,25% in 1880 and 63% again in 1980 and the pcrccntagc is even higher today (Larson 2000) . Evidently, NIPF owners who value the non-timber forest products are willing to pay the opportunity costs for not converting to other uses or more "efficient production forestry."
Management Intensity
As mentioned earlier, small scale NIPFs have lower management intensity for timber production. Typically, as the average parcel size declines to somc threshold, owncrs arc lcss likely to actively manage their lorests f'or sustainable timber production. As shown in Fig. 2 , NTPFs have a much lower percentage of timberland in planted pine, but very high percentage of land in non-stocked category, and within planted pine, NIPF has lower pcrccntagc of land in high yield.
It is likely that there are three major reasons for the reduced management intensity: 1) intensive management is difficult and more expensive on the small tracts; 2) NIPF owners prefer less intensive management in order to obtain greater non-timbcr valucs at thc cxpcnsc of timbcr production; 3 ) the small scale NIPF owners lack the knowledge and technical that would enable them to improve their timber management.
Even though many NIPF owners indicate timber production is not their primary objective, thcy arc still rcsponsivc to timbcr price. McComb (1 975) and Newman and Wear (1 993) find that timber production and profit maximization are still objectives of many NIPFs owners. Fig. 2 indicates that NIPF owners prefer hardwood and longer rotation. Maybe it is less intensive in terms of timbcr production, particularly wood for pulp and paper, but more intensive in non-timber forest management, which may be good because it also generates positive externalities to the society. 2002).
Timber Supply and Division of Land Use
Decreasing timber supply has been the major concern arising from decreasing land holding size. If timber is seen as a private good, there probably is no need to worry since the market can adjust. When timber prices rise, land value for industrial timbcr production will also risc, mcaning that it will be more expensive for NIPF owners to own land for consumption, not timber production, purposes. At a minimum, high timber prices will defer the land sales from industrial owners to small land holders. Policy-makcrs nccd to pay attention not just to the growing number of NIPF owners, but also the total acreage they hold. From 1993 to 2003, the total holding land by small NIPF owners (less than 50 acres) had increased by 10 million acres, which is small when compared with total forcstland in thc U.S. A slight incrcasc in timber productivity or timberland expansion can compensate the reduction of reduced timber supply from the expanded small ownership.
Globalization of timber supply and increase in timber productivity has prevented substantial increase in tirnbcr pricc. Other goods and scrviccs from land, such as residential houses, cannot be imported. Consequently the value of other useslor multiple uses (particularly the residential and recreational) for forestland rises in some regions (e.g., the U.S.) faster than that of the value for timber production. It is likely that private forests, particularly thosc in smallcr owncrships, will not intensively be used for timber production, simply because it is not wise emphasizing timber production at the expense of large non-wood benefits from the forests. Timber supply from the Southern hemisphere is becoming more and more important sincc it is morc economically efficient.
What we have witnessed in the last few decades is an increasing number of small forestland holders due to division of land use ownership. Domestically, some forest lands are parcelized and used primarily for non-timber productions, a phcnomcnon that can bc cxplaincd by transaction costs. While some forestlands have been used more intensively for timber production as technology changes, more forestlands are managed less intensively for timber production in order to get more non-timber benefits. Globally, timber supply from othcr countrics has largcly filled in the widening gap between domestic supply and demand.
Final Remarks
Before World War TI, farmers were seen as the best managers for private forests, while the forest industry was viewed only as loggers and speculators. Since then, forestry industry has come to , . . -, -"--. , A .,*-~ ,-*-* ~ -.-.,---~ --* -, ----review articles play a major role in private forest management while NIPFs have been criticized for managing their land lcss intcnsivcly.
Like Tyrrell and Dunning (2000) , we ask whether we need to prevent or slow parcelization. First, land parcelization is a process of exchange between the land rich but cash poor people and land poor but cash rich people. The exchange gencrates social welfare and leads to welfare redistribution. Some studies have Sound that more small private forest ownerships lead to social-economic development (Sisock 1998) . Second, as argued throughout the paper, small scale NIPF expansion has its own economic rationale -the efficiency of dircct consumption of forcst-bascd products and services that save the transaction costs. NIPF expansion may not necessarily be associated with forestland loss. Decreased management intensity and timber supply could be compensated through productivity increase in large industrial lands and intcrnational tradc. Thc dynamics of holding size change (or parcelization) is an adjustment of the supply for and demand of the forestland. Any changes in individual characteristics (e.g., change in income and age), society (e.g., population growth and wealth), and environment (e-g., thc acccssi bili ty to rccrcation rcsourccs from public lands) will change the holding size and management strategies.
We do not suggest that there are no problems with small-scale NIPFs. Forests not only produce timber but also generate many ecological and cnvironmcntal scrviccs that arc public goods. It is widely agreed that parcelization, when accompanied by fragmentation, has negative effects on biodiversity, watersheds, and ecosystems. We argue that the greatest need is for more effective policies to deal with the fragmentation effects of parcclization. As pointcd out in Larson (2000) , "attention should focus on the more important goal of helping new and old forest owners manage their forest effectively, rather than preventing '[parcelization]' per se."
There is a need to compare and examine the costs and bcncfits (both social and privatc) of dif-L'erent policies. So far, a variety of management approaches have been suggested to reduce the diseconomies of small NIPFs. The most common way is to provide technical and financial support from government to the small land owners. Row (1978) suggested that effects on financial returns can be reduced by managing small tracts in groups, coopcratives, or other aggrcgations of owners. There are practices in other countries, such as collaboration and changing practices in timber selling, road construction, capital markets, and tools and machinery, that could be implemented in the U.S. to support small scale of NIPF landowners (e.g., Uusivuori and Kuuluvainen 2001) . Schelhas (2000) proposed several means to support small land owners: 1) establishing business entities for multiple-owner forest management, 2) fostering forestry activities across ownership boundaries; 3) dcvcloping multi-purposc forest management to meet forest owner's multiple objectives; 4) using different management strategies for different sized forests, and 5) developing partnership with diverse forest interests.
